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Developmental Regionalism and Regional
Value Chains: Pitfalls to South Africa’s 
Vision for the Tripartite Free Trade Area
Sören Scholvin
Abstract: Regional integration via the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
(TFTA) received a significant boost when the South African parliament 
signed the corresponding agreement in October 2018. This article un-
covers the convictions and objectives that drive South Africa’s commit-
ment to the TFTA. It reveals that South Africa sees the TFTA as a 
means of “developmental regionalism,” which is expected to facilitate 
region-wide industrialisation based on value addition in regional value 
chains (RVCs). For this purpose, South Africa seeks to coordinate indus-
trial policies within the TFTA and rehabilitate infrastructure jointly with 
the regional states. In addition to explaining the logic behind these goals, 
and analysing how far they have already been achieved, the article also 
highlights important challenges to South Africa’s vision for the TFTA. It 
calls the prospects of developmental regionalism into question, being 
particularly sceptical about the way in which RVCs are conceived. 
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Introduction
In October 2018, the South African parliament ratified the Tripartite Free 
Trade Area (TFTA) agreement. Ten years earlier, the 26 member states of 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the 
East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) had declared that they wanted to form this regional 
economic bloc. They later agreed on a road map, giving priority to the 
coordination of industrial policies, the facilitation of trade in goods, and 
to infrastructure development. By now, the TFTA has developed frame-
work agreements on tariff liberalisation and rules of origin as well as 
common approaches to overcoming non-tariff trade barriers. 
Whereas there is an abundance of literature on regional integration 
in Africa, less has been published specifically on the TFTA itself. Using 
quantitative models, economists have assessed the potential benefits of 
this project. Mold and Mukwaya (2016) conclude that regional trade in 
manufactured goods will receive a major boost if the TFTA becomes 
reality. Willenbockel (2013) finds that the welfare benefits of overcoming 
tariff and non-tariff barriers via the TFTA will be tremendous. A similar 
approach by Grinsted Jensen and Sandrey (2015) shows that subregional 
integration is not as beneficial as integrating the TFTA as a whole, and 
particular attention should be paid to time-in-transit costs. 
Political scientists, meanwhile, have concentrated on the negotiation 
process. Erasmus (2015) emphasises its slow progress, and obstacles 
ahead. Naumann (2015) addresses the harmonisation of rules of origin. 
Mutai (2016) suggests what a TFTA intellectual property protocol should 
look like. Viljoen (2011) argues that customs procedures and administra-
tive requirements, technical standards, government participation in trade, 
and the lack of physical infrastructure are together the critical non-tariff 
trade barriers that the TFTA ought to address. Erasmus, Hartzenberg, and 
Kalenga (2016) also elaborate on such key issues. They furthermore assess 
the principles agreed for the negotiations, concluding that these reflect “a 
compromise [that] will be difficult to become implemented” (Erasmus, 
Hartzenberg, and Kalenga 2016: 90). Cheluget and Wright (2017) draw 
similar conclusions, referring to the experiences made by COMESA. 
In a nutshell, previous research makes a strong case for why the 
TFTA should indeed be pursued. It sheds light on the path towards 
realising the project, and related challenges. There is, however, almost no 
research on the convictions that drive individual states and their ideas 
about the exact purpose(s) of the TFTA, with Ghoneim (2013) as well as 
Scholvin and Wrana (2015) being notable exceptions. Since many details 
of the TFTA remain to be developed by its member states, it is im-
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portant to know more about such convictions and ideas, as they will 
determine the exact form that the TFTA eventually takes. Not all states 
that participate in the TFTA are equally relevant. Many of them have 
very limited diplomatic capacities, and do not even consider regional 
integration a national priority. South Africa, meanwhile, does appear to 
be both capable and willing when it comes to shaping the TFTA. 
Therefore, I analyse here specifically South Africa’s convictions re-
garding the TFTA. By convictions, I mean ideas on causal mechanisms – 
for example, on how trade with African countries facilitates South Afri-
ca’s own development. These explain why there is a motivation to pur-
sue policy A rather than policy B. Due to convictions, the implementa-
tion of policy A becomes a goal or an objective.1 My analysis reveals that 
South Africa seeks to promote “developmental regionalism,” based on 
region-wide industrialisation and regional value chains (RVCs). In addi-
tion to explaining the logic behind these goals, the article presents likely 
pitfalls relating to South Africa’s vision for the TFTA – drawing a largely 
pessimistic conclusion on the prospects of developmental regionalism, 
and especially RVCs as they are conceived by South Africa. 
South African Expectations on the TFTA
To capture the convictions that drive South Africa with regard to the 
TFTA, and the particularities of how it seeks to advance regional integra-
tion, I have assessed national policy documents, the academic literature, 
as well as media reports. I refer to eight interviews with government 
officials and private consultants. Three were conducted in written format 
in 2013 or 2014, five in person during a research trip to South Africa in 
2016. The interviewees have all played a major role in the negotiations 
on the TFTA or are experts on corresponding matters, having a track 
record of providing consultancy to or working in leading positions at 
government ministries. All interviewees agreed to being recorded (or to 
provide written answers to my questions), but they asked to remain 
anonymous. 
1 In other words, convictions are firmly held beliefs or opinions on how things 
work. This means that I stick to how the term is used in a neutral way in every-
day language. My understanding of convictions is hence different from that ad-
vanced by Dyson (2009) and Holmes (2010), among others. What they define 
as “conviction politics” has nothing to do with this article. Conviction politics 
refers rather to the ideologies driving certain politicians such as Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, making them unwilling to accept any compro-
mise that contradicts their own personal convictions. 
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Developmental Regionalism
South Africa’s vision for the TFTA reflects a paradigm that an inter-
viewee from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) called devel-
opmental regionalism. He defined it as a strategy focused on industrial 
production. To him, this means that the regional states jointly advance 
transport infrastructure projects and align them with coordinated indus-
trial policies. In consequence, the regional market becomes broader. 
RVCs are boosted (more on this later).2 These thoughts are confirmed 
by Vickers (2016), who summarises how South Africa has promoted 
regional trade through market integration, infrastructure rehabilitation, 
and industrial policy initiatives – in particular, in SADC and the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU). 
As a policy concept, developmental regionalism first emerged in 
Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean advocated restrictive import substi-
tution in combination with redistributive measures among the regional 
countries. Already then, developmental regionalism aimed at providing 
“the expanded markets and the increasingly efficient use of resources [in 
RVCs] necessary for the accelerated economic growth of each member” 
(Sloan 1971: 142). Developmental regionalism was expected to help 
Third World countries through economies of scale in an integrated market, 
the specialisation of each country in certain segments of RVCs, and in-
creasing international competitiveness as a result of its intensification also 
within the region itself. It was also seen as a means to end the dependence 
on overseas manufactured inputs to production, and should furthermore 
politically strengthen Third World countries vis-à-vis the Global North 
(Sloan 1971). 
More recently, the term has become associated with the structural 
policy programmes of the European Union and efforts by the Asian 
Development Bank to reduce core–periphery disparities through  
a capacity-building process targeted at periphery states to help 
them engage in the regional economic dynamics and draw them 
closer into core economic zones of the region (Dent 2008: 781; on 
developmental regionalism in East Asia, see also Nesadurai 2003). 
In a nutshell, developmental regionalism is about proactive economic 
policies advanced and coordinated by the states of the region in question – 
as opposed to a politically passive approach of mere liberalisation. In 
Africa, developmental regionalism gained prominence with the publica-
2 Written conversation with a senior official, DTI, 22 January 2014. 
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tion of the 2013 Economic Development in Africa Report (UN Commission 
Conference on Trade and Development 2013). The report stresses that 
the regional countries ought to go beyond trade facilitation, also cooper-
ating on issues such as investment, research and development, as well as 
policies aimed at regional industrial development and regional infrastruc-
ture provision. 
As indicated, South Africa’s idea of developmental regionalism 
through the TFTA rests on two core pillars: the coordination of indus-
trial policies and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. Immediately after 
the TFTA was launched, the member states took first steps towards 
easing transport from one country to another by harmonising their ad-
ministrative procedures (Disenyana 2009). A special programme for 
monitoring, reporting, and removing non-tariff barriers has been set up.3 
Common axle load limits, which are necessary to prevent road damage 
due to overload, have been agreed for the TFTA. They still remain to be 
applied, though. Carrier’s licenses are mutually recognised, theoretically 
permitting a vehicle with a license valid for one country to operate in the 
entire TFTA; this system is not operational yet, however. 
Regional infrastructure projects have also been boosted by so-called 
presidential initiatives, through which heads of state – including former 
South African president Jacob Zuma – champion individual projects to 
give them more prominence. An interviewee from the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) explained that South 
Africa’s role in this regard is limited to coordination. For instance, each 
transit country of the North–South Corridor, which stretches from Dar-
es Salaam to Durban, has to ensure that roads are functional. This is 
challenging, as the interviewee emphasised, because of the severe finan-
cial constraints that many regional countries face. He added that building 
new infrastructure is not that difficult. Rather, countries are often unable 
to guarantee subsequent maintenance.4 
International donors help to overcome this challenge. The Tripartite 
Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme – officially launched in 
2017, and financed by the EU to the tune of EUR 18 million – aims to 
facilitate the development of a more competitive, integrated, and liberal-
ised regional road transport market. This objective is to be achieved 
through harmonised road transport policies, laws, regulations and stand-
ards, as well as a transport register for East Africa and Southern Africa. 
TFTA cooperation ties up with the Programme for Infrastructure De-
3 The system operates via a website, available online at: <www.tradebarriers.org>. 
4 Personal interview with a senior official, DIRCO, 29 June 2016. 
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velopment in Africa (PIDA n.d.), which is run by the African Develop-
ment Bank. Among the various PIDA projects, which depend on pub-
lic–private partnerships because of an expected expenditure of USD 360 
billion between 2011 and 2040, the Southern Africa Hub Port and Rail 
Programme takes an outstanding role. It aims at developing a master plan 
for the regional port capacity of the SADC countries, coordinating expan-
sion plans for Beira, Durban, Luanda, Maputo, Nacala, and Walvis Bay. 
Still, the actual implementation of the many sound ideas on how to 
integrate and rehabilitate the region’s infrastructure remains uncertain. 
As a whole, Africa suffers from a major “infrastructure gap” in terms of 
electrification, Internet access, as well as railway and road corridors (Af-
rican Development Bank 2018). The annual spending on infrastructure 
lags far behind what experts consider necessary. 
Coming back to the TFTA, the question is, then, whether this or-
ganisation constitutes the right framework by which to address this in-
sufficient infrastructure. One of the interviewed consultants asked: “Why 
should South Africa discuss transport corridors with Egypt?”5 Although 
there is an apparent need to coordinate infrastructure projects across 
borders, one may wonder to what extent the TFTA will be able to make 
visions of hub ports for the region and regionally integrated railway and 
road corridors a reality. Another consultant criticised the fact that Afri-
can states, including South Africa, tend to “put things into regional inte-
gration that should be done nationally or even at a subnational level.” 
She continued by arguing that “getting everything onto a wish list and 
expecting international donors to pay is just nonsense.”6 
Regional Value Chains
“We see regional integration as an important vehicle for our develop-
ment,” the aforementioned interviewee from DIRCO pointed out.7 The 
New Growth Path – a framework document on economic policy – iden-
tifies regional integration as a driver of job creation. It proposes “to 
widen the market for South African goods and services through a 
stronger focus on exports to the region” (Economic Development De-
partment 2011: 21). The DTI suggests that economic growth in Africa is 
“the biggest stimulus to long-term growth in South Africa” (2013: 20). 
Two DTI officials stressed that the TFTA will broaden South Africa’s 
privileged market access from presently 15 SADC countries to 26 Afri-
5 Personal interview with a private consultant, 21 June 2016. 
6 Personal interview with a private consultant, 30 June 2016. 
7 Personal interview with a senior official, DIRCO, 29 June 2016. 
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can ones, and with it “a total of 600 million people.”8 A third DTI inter-
viewee linked regional integration to economic growth. The latter is, as 
he explained, the path towards poverty reduction. Like his colleagues, he 
highlighted the size of the TFTA market, which “could launch a sizeable 
part of the continent onto a new developmental trajectory” by attracting 
foreign investment and boosting more diversified regional trade.9 
Going into detail, a fourth interviewee from the DTI presented the 
TFTA as an opportunity to reinforce value addition in the entire region 
or, in her words, to “work together to boost each other’s [industrial] 
capacities” in RVCs. She emphasised that manufacturing is the link be-
tween regional trade and economic growth.10 Presently, African countries 
suffer from unfavourable integration into the world economy, predomi-
nantly exporting raw materials while importing manufactured goods – 
including manufactured inputs to production (Geyer 2019). From the 
DTI’s (2014) perspective, this explains the lack of backward and forward 
linkages, also leading to low competitiveness and productivity in value-
adding sectors. “Competitive manufacturing […] will have to be the 
game-changer as far as sustained and inclusive growth is concerned” 
(DTI 2014: 76), the 2015 Industrial Policy Action Plan points out. 
Value chains of global and regional scale have been a cornerstone of 
research and policy advice on economic development ever since the mid-
1990s. As an analytical concept, they reflect the fact that the production 
of goods and services is fragmented into various segments that are locat-
ed at different sites around the globe – resource extraction, manufactur-
ing, and marketing take place several thousand kilometres apart. In glob-
al value chains (GVCs), powerful corporations from Europe and North 
America appropriate an increasing share of profits, leaving little for their 
subsidiaries and suppliers in developing countries (Kaplinsky 2005; Mil-
berg and Winkler 2013). Due to non-tariff trade barriers such as high 
quality standards, firms from the Global South often fail to upgrade their 
position within GVCs or to even participate in them at all (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2004; Gereffi and Lee 2012). Low entry barriers and intense 
competition in low-technology manufacturing meanwhile enable firms 
from the Global North to relocate their activities from one developing 
country to another, additionally squeezing profit margins in the Global 
South (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001). 
RVCs – being a pillar of developmental regionalism – are a means 
to bypass the disadvantages of GVCs. As one of the DTI interviewees 
8 Written conversation with two officials, DTI, 20 December 2013. 
9 Written conversation with a senior official, DTI, 22 January 2014. 
10 Personal interview with an official, DTI, 22 June 2016. 
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emphasised, South Africa seeks to facilitate RVCs through the TFTA 
because “we don’t benefit enough from global value chains.”11 RVCs 
moreover promise an advantageous position for South Africa: reflecting 
the country’s competitive advantages, it could focus on the lucrative 
upper segments, whereas others would supply basic inputs and purchase 
South African products. For example, the Industrial Policy Action Plan 
from 2011 states that there are considerable opportunities for South 
African firms in the oil and gas sector across the continent. Cape Town 
and Durban may position themselves as logistics and supply hubs. Manu-
facturing for the continent in the renewable energies sector is another 
opportunity mentioned in the plan (DTI 2011; on the prospects of Cape 
Town, see Scholvin 2017). The DTI (2016) also sees potential for South 
Africa as a regional rail production hub. 
Challenges to Regional Value Chains
The prospects for RVCs are not as clear as the previous section suggests, 
however. A consultant rejected the idea of South Africa being or becom-
ing a manufacturing hub. He argued that it imports manufactured goods 
from overseas and re-exports them to Africa. South Africa rather serves 
as a hub for logistics and warehousing. The interviewee saw considerable 
potential to expand this role, but pointed out that “surprisingly, [trade in 
services] is an issue not advanced by South Africa [in the TFTA negotia-
tions].”12 Another consultant agreed, saying that South Africa “has basi-
cally taken trade in services off the agenda.”13 Studies published by the 
World Bank suggest that there is potential for South Africa to act as a 
hub to its neighbours’ spokes. However, while labour intensity in South 
African manufacturing is expected to decline as skill intensity increases, 
jobs could still be created through backward linkages – particularly in 
services (Farole 2016). 
The government’s neglect of trade in services is not the only chal-
lenge to realising RVCs. The regional countries cannot be expected to 
accept a subordinate position vis-à-vis South Africa. Secondary powers – 
in particular Angola and Kenya – have already begun economic balanc-
ing against the hegemon, or are likely to do so in future (Scholvin 2018). 
A third consultant pointed out that South African bureaucrats – not 
necessarily politicians – have only recently recognised that regional inte-
gration must lead to win-win situations. At least in the past, “South Afri-
11 Personal interview with a senior official, DTI, 5 September 2016. 
12 Personal interview with a private consultant, 22 June 2016. 
13 Personal interview with a private consultant, 21 June 2016. 
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ca was a problem,” because it saw the region as an export market – evok-
ing resentment towards South Africa among governments and people, 
with this having also negatively affected private investors too.14 Ac-
knowledging this pitfall, one DTI official reasoned that “it’s not fair to 
create a regional market, if all it’s gonna be is a market for South Afri-
ca.”15 
Despite this changing mindset, effective cooperation on RVCs re-
mains but a vision. The just-quoted DTI interviewee explained that the 
TFTA has only concluded a corresponding framework agreement.16 
Even the SADC Industrial Development Implementation Matrix, which 
is, from the interviewee’s viewpoint, much more advanced, merely out-
lines interventions necessary for RVCs in a non-binding and unspecified 
way. Nothing is said about how to make use of country-specific competi-
tive advantages, and the document underlines that the “formulation and 
implementation of industrial policy is essentially a national prerogative” 
(SADC n.d.: 4). A consultant added that ideas on how to set up RVCs 
have become somewhat concrete only in the mining sector. A corres-
ponding study by one of her colleagues has been discussed by bureau-
crats from various countries, not by politicians.17 
In this regard, another consultant hinted at South Africa’s high un-
employment rate and asked: “Why on earth would a [South African] 
government official try to persuade companies to relocate to other coun-
tries [in the TFTA]?”18 He added that, based on his own experience as a 
former executive in the DTI, “it is easy to bring ministers together and 
have them agree that we want to cooperate on industrialisation some-
how.” Yet such vague declarations, which do still serve as a guiding vi-
sion, are not implemented because of the aforementioned obstacles.19 
Already in the 1970s, scholars in favour of RVCs admitted that states 
would hardly allow supranational institutions to take corresponding deci-
sions. The geographical organisation of RVCs, which is essentially a win-
lose situation, was expected to lead to difficult bargaining processes 
(Sloan 1971). 
Being generally opposed to the idea of RVCs in the TFTA, one of 
the interviewed consultants provided an alternative explanation of South 
Africa’s commitment to regional integration. He suggested that the DTI 
14 Personal interview with a private consultant, 30 June 2016. 
15 Personal interview with a senior official, DTI, 5 September 2016. 
16 Personal interview with a senior official, DTI, 5 September 2016. 
17 Personal interview with a private consultant, 30 June 2016. 
18 Personal interview with a private consultant, 21 June 2016. 
19 Personal interview with a private consultant, 21 June 2016. 
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is “afraid” of overseas investment in the regional countries and ensuing 
exports to South Africa, possibly related to the emergence of a liberalised 
regional hub such as Kenya. South Africa therefore seeks to make all 
TFTA states adapt its own version of industrialisation through protec-
tionism, so that “what happens domestically is replicated in other parts 
of the continent […]. This basically means regional protectionism against 
the outside world.”20 
This conviction is exemplified by recent statements by DTI chief 
director Wamkele Mene, who argued that rules of origin should be a 
mechanism to prevent non-members flooding the TFTA market through 
the member country with the most liberal trade regime (Business Day 
2018). Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that an ambitious initial 
proposal by COMESA to liberalise all trade was quickly watered down 
by South Africa. Now, only 65 per cent of trade within the TFTA is to 
be liberalised (if negotiations are successful). 
Further to this, it appears that South Africa neglects opportunities 
within GVCs. The fourth DTI interviewee said that “if there are players 
[in the region], there will be no need for [overseas] investment.” She 
added that the TFTA was meant to ensure that “the region benefits 
more than third parties [do],” hinting at the fact that investors from 
overseas rather repatriate profits instead of re-investing them locally.21 
RVCs must not be seen as an alternative to GVCs, though. RVCs are 
usually tied to GVCs, implying that development at the regional scale 
may benefit from extra-regional impulses – especially in countries or 
locations that serve as gateways, and thus connect the global and regional 
spheres (Ngarachu, Draper, and Owino 2017; Scholvin et al. 2019). 
Statements by some of the interviewees come close to this idea: they 
expect that a sufficient level of regional development and market size 
will attract overseas investment, with non-African investors themselves 
setting up RVCs.22 The Industrial Policy Action Plan from 2016 pro-
vides two illustrative examples of RVCs being interlinked with GVCs: 
Daimler is expected to make South Africa its service base for most of 
SADC. Volvo’s distribution centre in Gauteng consolidates the firm’s logis-
tics operations for sub-Saharan Africa (DTI 2016). Interestingly, these ex-
amples lead back to South Africa absorbing the upper segments of RVCs – 
possibly to the detriment of other countries. 
20 Personal interview with a private consultant, 22 June 2016. 
21 Personal interview with an official, DTI, 22 June 2016. 
22 Personal interviews with an official, DTI, 22 June 2016, and with a senior 
official, DIRCO, 29 June 2016. 
 Developmental Regionalism and Regional Value Chains 125 
Conclusion
The objective of this article was to uncover South Africa’s convictions 
and related goals regarding the TFTA. In this way, the article contributes 
to closing a significant research gap arising from the lack of research 
hitherto on the specific convictions that drive South Africa’s commit-
ment to the TFTA. I have shown that South Africa sees the TFTA as a 
means of developmental regionalism, which is meant to advance region-
wide industrialisation. As a policy concept, developmental regionalism is 
based on the idea that a relatively large and somewhat protected regional 
market will allow each regional country to specialise in certain segments 
of RVCs, thus participating in value addition. The coordination of indus-
trial policies – meaning the facilitation of RVCs – and joint infrastructure 
projects are critical for this purpose. 
However, there are important pitfalls in developmental regionalism 
as it is envisaged by South Africa. In addition to challenges in overcom-
ing Africa’s infrastructure gap through the TFTA, the idea of RVCs 
being the path towards industrialisation is problem-laden. Corresponding 
debates are far from actual implementation, and setting up RVCs will 
lead to win-lose situations – with barely surmountable conflicts over who 
receives the most lucrative segments of such value chains. South Africa’s 
focus on trade in goods means that the much greater potential of trade in 
services is neglected. Taking a very critical perspective, one may even 
argue that South Africa tries to use the TFTA as a means to make the 
regional states adopt its own version of protectionist industrial develop-
ment, which implies that the opportunities for interlinking RVCs with 
GVCs will be ultimately foregone. 
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„Developmental Regionalism“ und regionale Güterketten:  
Fallstricke für Südafrikas Vision der Tripartite Freihandelszone 
 
Zusammenfassung: Mit der Unterzeichnung des Abkommens über die 
Tripartite Freihandelszone (TFTA) durch das südafrikanische Parlament 
im Oktober 2018 erhielt regionale Integration einen erheblichen Schub. 
In diesem Beitrag werden Südafrikas Überzeugungen und Ziele hinsicht-
lich der TFTA untersucht. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass Südafrika die TFTA 
als ein Mittel für „Developmental Regionalism“, also entwicklungsorien-
tierten Regionalismus, betrachtet. Südafrika erwartet von der Freihandels-
zone, dass sie regionale Industrialisierung auf Grundlage regionaler Gü-
terketten befördert. Deswegen bemüht sich Südafrika, Industriepolitik 
mit den anderen Staaten in der Region zu koordinieren und gemeinsam 
Infrastrukturprojekte voranzutreiben. Der Beitrag erläutert die Logik, die 
hinter diesen Zielen steht. Er stellt außerdem dar, inwieweit bereits 
Ergebnisse erzielt wurden, und geht näher auf Fallstricke für Südafrikas 
Vision der TFTA ein. Darauf aufbauend werden die Erfolgsaussichten 
von Developmental Regionalism in Zweifel gezogen, vor allem im 
Hinblick darauf, wie südafrikanische Entscheidungsträger regionale Gü-
terketten verstehen. 
 
Schlagwörter: Südafrika, developmental regionalism, regionale Güter-
ketten, Tripartite Freihandelszone 
